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Abstract
This paper studies the pro-growth policies in an endogenous growth model
where heterogeneous entrepreneurs face collateral constraints, skilled workers
accumulate human capital, and the government intervenes to promote human
and physical capital formation. It shows that the model has a balanced-growth
path whose rate depends on government policy and financial development level.
The theoretical analysis also shows that when the distribution of idiosyncratic
productivity is heavy-tailed, the government must subsidize productive en-
trepreneurs to achieve optimal pro-growth policies.
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1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question of how the government should implement its pro-
growth policies in an environment where financial markets are imperfect, firm pro-
ductivity is heterogeneous, and human capital is accumulated by skilled workers.
More specifically, the paper investigates the government’s pro-growth policies of how
to optimally allocate its public spending to promote human capital formation and
how to intervene into the capital market to facilitate physical capital accumulation.
When financial markets are imperfect, entrepreneurs even those with high pro-
ductivity face borrowing collateral constraints, hence, are unable to borrow funds to
a desired level to extend production while relatively low productive ones participate
in producing goods. Consequently, capital is not efficiently allocated and there are
losses in the aggregated productivity. 1 Moreover, because of borrowing collateral
constraints, for a given level of financial development the amount of funds that an
entrepreneur can borrow depends on his own personal wealth. Consequently, it is
intuitive that one of the effective pro-growth policies is to facilitate the personal
wealth accumulation of highly productive entrepreneurs so that they can borrow
more funds to extend production, hence, improving economic growth. However,
sources of economic growth are also driven by another important and significant
factor, the improvement in the quality of labor or the human capital formation, in
which the government policies also play in an important role via public spending on
education, job-training and health programs, etc. As a result, for a given amount of
tax revenue, the government faces a tradeoff between those policies that encourage
the efficient allocation of funds to highly productive entrepreneurs and those that
promote human capital acquisition.
To address the question above, I construct a two-sector endogenous growth model
with a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs, a continuum of representative
skilled workers, and the government. Entrepreneurs with heterogeneous produc-
1In the absence of financial frictions, only entrepreneurs with the highest productivity produce
goods, therefore, capital is efficiently allocated to the most productive entrepreneurs and aggregate
measured productivity is at its first-best level.
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tivity own private firms that produce goods, accumulate personal wealth and face
borrowing collateral constraints because of financial frictions. Representative skilled
workers accumulate human capital by using their own efforts, the existing human
capital stock and public eduction provided by the government. The government also
intervenes into the capital input market by subsidizing capital-bill use of actively
producing entrepreneurs and collects (capital) income taxes. The constant return to
scale in goods production implies that entrepreneurs’ profits are a linear function of
capital. Therefore, at equilibrium, there exists a threshold of entrepreneurs who are
active in producing goods, which depends only on the level of financial deepening.
Moreover, the more heterogeneous are entrepreneurs the more distant is the pro-
ductivity cut-off from the average (mean) productivity level of active entrepreneurs.
This in turn implies that capital is less efficiently used because at equilibrium the
capital rental rate is equal to marginal product of capital of producers who are at
the productivity cut-off. The theoretical analysis shows that when the degree of
heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic productivity is high, the optimal pro-
growth policy can only achieved or implemented by appropriately subsidizing active
entrepreneurs. It also identifies the conditions under which subsidizing entrepreneurs
is required to achieve optimal policy and showing the optimal policy rule between
taxing and subsidizing. Intuitively, when the entrepreneurs’ productivity distribution
is heavy-tailed, hence, under the i.i.d productivity assumption, the share of wealth
held by productive entrepreneurs is relatively high. However, because of financial
frictions the capital rental rate is relatively low, therefore, subsidizing capital use
will lead to a higher rental rate and more efficient aggregated wealth accumulation.
By contrast, when the degree of heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ productivity is
not so high so that the marginal producers, namely those who producing at the pro-
ductivity cut-off, are relatively close to the aggregated average (mean) level of active
entrepreneurs, the theoretical analysis shows that subsidizing active entrepreneurs is
not necessarily required to achieve the optimal pro-growth policy. In other words, to
implement the optimal policy, the government just appropriately utilizes the asset
income tax instrument and then spends all their revenues on public education to
promote human capital formation.
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Related Literature: This paper belongs to the branch of burgeoning literature
that studies the interactions between financial frictions, entrepreneurship, resource
misallocation, and aggregated productivity (see e.g. Banerjee and Duflo 2005, Buera
et al 2011; Buera and Shin 2013; Midrigan and Xu 2014, Moll 2014). 2 It contributes
to this branch of literature by incorporating taxation and the human capital accu-
mulation in the spirit of Uzawa-Lucas into an endogenous growth model and shows
that government policies and the level of financial development can affect balanced
growth path equilibrium. This paper however differs from the traditional Uzawa-
Lucas framework by embracing heterogeneous agents and considering the role of
public education in human capital formation of skilled workers. 3
This paper extends from the theoretical framework of Nguyen (2018b) by adding
policy instruments to study optimal growth policy. Specifically, Nguyen (2018b) in-
corporates human capital and public education financed into the theoretical model
of Moll (2014) to investigate the effects financial deepening on the accumulation of
physical and human capital and working hours in a two-sector endogenous growth
model 4. Nguyen (2018b) analytically shows that in the presence of financial market
imperfections, capital taxation exerts U-shaped effects on the balanced growth path
rate and that optimal policy rates and balanced-growth path rates are increasing
functions of the level of financial deepening. This paper is also close to Otskhoki
and Moll (2018) that studies the optimal dynamic Ramsey policies in a standard
growth model with financial friction and heterogeneous producers. The differences
are that Otskhoki and Moll (2018) does not include human capital and government
policy for human capital formation; it just focuses on policies in product and factor
markets during the process of transitioning to the steady state equilibrium. This
paper addresses optimal policy on the balanced-growth path equilibrium and focuses
on the role of human capital formation in the endogenous growth framework. Unlike
2See Buera et al. (2015) for a thorough review of this literature.
3See e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2014 for the introduction and review of the Uzawa-Lucas
model and related literature.
4Moll (2014) introduces productivity persistence into the previous work of Angeletos (2007)
and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), and shows that self-financing can undo capital mis-allocation and
reduce the long-run steady state TFP losses when the shocks are sufficiently persistent.
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Otskhoki and Moll (2018), this paper shows that it is always optimal to impose a
positive tax rate on capital income when public education plays a positive role in hu-
man capital accumulation. Finally, this paper differs from both Nguyen (2018b) and
Otskhoki and Moll (2018) by incorporating endogenous policy instruments that are
contingent on entrepreneurs’ idiosyncratic productivity and personal wealth, there-
fore, it is able to address more general policy function forms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model economy. Sec-
tion 3 defines and analyzes the aggregate equilibrium and the balanced-growth path
equilibrium. Section 4 then discusses the of government’s optimal policy to achieve
maximum balanced growth rate. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This is a two-sector growth model with a representative skilled worker and a unit
measure of entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur has a private firm and is indexed by
his productivity, z, and personal wealth, a. Heterogeneous firms use effective labor
and physical capital to produce homogenous final goods for both consumption and
physical capital investment. Human capital is built by skilled worker’s efforts, the
existing human capital stock and also public eduction provided by the government.
The government collects tax to finance its spending.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
All entrepreneurs have the same preferences,
E0
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log ce(t)dt (2.1)
where ce denotes entrepreneur’s consumption.
Each entrepreneur owns a firm. At each time, the firm employs nd efficiency
units of labor at the wage rate, w(t) and rents kd units of physical capital from a
competitive capital market at the rental rate, r(t), to produce homogeneous final
4
goods with the following production technology,
y = f(z, k, n) = (zk)αn1−α (2.2)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and z denotes idiosyncratic entrepreneurial productivity.
Specifically, we assume each moment entrepreneurs draw z from a Pareto distri-
bution whose distribution function is given by,
G(z) =
{
1− (1
z
)ϕ
z ≥ 1
0 z < 1
(2.3)
where ϕ > 1 is the shape parameter. Smaller ϕ corresponds to a heavier tail of
the productivity distribution, i.e., a higher fraction of very productive entrepreneurs,
therefore, implying a higher degree of productivity heterogeneity among entrepreneurs.
We also assume that idiosyncratic productivity z is i.i.d over time as well as across
entrepreneurs so that the law of large numbers implies that the population share of
type z entrepreneurs is stationary and deterministic.
Each entrepreneur obtains profits from his private firm, which is defined as,
pi(z, k, n) ≡ f(z, k, n)− wn− (1− ηk(z))rk
where ηk(z) is the capital subsidy rate policy that depends on idiosyncratic produc-
tivity of the entrepreneurs.
Each entrepreneur also receives capital returns from his personal assets. Hence,
his personal wealth a(t) evolves as follows: 5
a˙ = pi(z, k, n) + (1− τa(a))ra− ce (2.4)
where τa(a) denotes the tax rate policy on asset income.
The entrepreneur at the same time faces the following borrowing constraint:
k ≤ λa (2.5)
5It is straightforward to show that rental capital market setting is equivalent to a setup where
entrepreneurs own and accumulate capital and are allowed to trade a risk-free bond. For simplicity,
I consider only capital income tax in the main text and the Appendix shows that similar analytical
results can be obtained when labor income tax instrument is added.
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where λ ≥ 1 denotes the maximum borrowing leverage ratio that reflects the degree
of financial deepening. This borrowing constraint states that the maximum amount
of capital an individual entrepreneur can borrow is limited by the amount of his per-
sonal assets, a, and the efficiency of the financial markets reflected by the maximum
borrowing leverage ratio λ. In particular, λ = 1 expresses financial autarky where
entrepreneurs are completely capital self-financed whereas λ = ∞ denotes perfect
financial markets where entrepreneurs can borrow freely.6
Each entrepreneur maximizes the profit of his private firm subject to the technol-
ogy (2.2) and his borrowing constraint (2.5), hence his static optimization problem
at each time t can be expressed as follows:
Π(a, z) = max
k,n
{f(z, k, n)− wn− (1− ηk(z))rk}
s.t. k ≤ λa
The first order condition of this problem with respect to efficiency units of labor
requires: (1 − α)(zk)αn−α = w. Consequently, the implied labor demand becomes,
nd =
(
1−α
w
) 1
α (zk). After substituting the optimal labor demand into the technology
equation (2.2) we then obtain the production function that is linear in individual
entrepreneurs capital input as: F (z, k) =
(
1−α
w
) 1−α
α (zk).
Therefore, an entrepreneur’s optimization problem becomes:
Π(a, z) = max
k
{
α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
zk − (1− ηk(z))rk
}
s.t. k ≤ λa
The optimization conditions of this problem imply that his capital and effective
labor demands and profits are linear in personal wealth; and there is a productivity
6See Buera and Shin (2013) and Moll (2014) for further discussions of this borrowing constraint
and Nguyen (2018a) for the case where the maximum borrowing leverage ratio is endogenous.
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cutoff for active entrepreneurs z as follows:
Π(a, z) = max {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r, 0}λa
kd(a, z) = λa · 1{z≥z} (2.6)
nd(a, z) =
(
1− α
w
) 1
α
zλa (2.7)
zpi = [1− ηk(z = z)] r (2.8)
pi ≡ α
(
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
(2.9)
At the same time, entrepreneurs also maximize the expected sum of discounted
utilities (2.1) subject to the budget constraint (2.4), which can now be rewritten as:
a˙ = [λmax {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r, 0}+ (1− τa(a))r] a− ce
This in turn implies the optimal consumption rule, ce(t) = ρa(t).
a˙ = s(z)a, where : (2.10)
s(z) = λmax {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r, 0}+ (1− τa(a))r − ρ
The net amount of tax (asset tax minus capital subsidy) that an entrepreneur
with personal wealth a(t) pays to the government is therefore,
Te =
[
τa(a)− ληk(z) · 1{z≥z}
]
ra
2.2 The Representative Skilled Worker
The representative workers has the following preferences,∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log cw(t)dt (2.11)
where ρ is the discount rate and cw is the worker’s consumption.
At time t, the worker has one unit of non-leisure time and human capital stock,
h(t). He then divides a fraction u(t) of his non-leisure time to supply u(t)h(t) effi-
ciency units of labor at a competitive labor market at a wage w(t). The left fraction
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of time 1−u(t) is used to increase his level of human capital stock via as the following
technology: 7
h˙ = b(1− u)hφg1−φe (2.12)
where φ ∈ (0, 1), b is a parameter that denotes the efficiency of accumulating human
capital and ge is the level of government expenditures on public education and health
programs. 8
As in Moll (2014), we assume that the worker does not have access to financial
markets and consume all their labor incomes. Hence, his budget constraint is as
follows:9
cw(t) = u(t)h(t)w(t) (2.13)
The representative worker maximizes the sum of discounted utilities (2.11) subject
to the budget constraint (2.13) and human capital accumulation (2.12) while taking
the amount of public spending on education ge(t) as given. After substituting the
budget constraint into the instantaneous utility function and denoting the current-
value costate variable by µ(t), the current-value Hamiltonian for the representative
worker’ optimization problem can be expressed as:
H (u, h, λ) = log [wuh] + µ
[
b(1− u)hφg1−φe
]
The F.O.Cs of this optimization state:
1
u
= µbhφg1−φe
1
h
+ µ
(
φb(1− u)hφ−1g1−φe
)
= ρµ− µ˙
lim
t→∞
e−ρtµ(t)h(t) = 0
7Because φ is less than one, (2.12) implies that the production of human capital exhibits dimin-
ishing returns to existing level of human capital stock, h(t). When φ = 1 we have the traditional
Uzawa-Lucas model setting where the accumulation of human capital depends only on private
investment input, 1− u(t) and h(t).
8Because human capital in this model means the quality of labor, government spending on
human capital development can be interpreted generally. It can include not only public education
but also spending on public health and other on-the-training programs.
9An important implication of this assumption is that since workers do not participate in the
capital markets, their behavior is not directly affected by the the process of capital accumulation.
8
These F.O.Cs together with the evolution equation for h imply that optimal
allocating time to work, u(t), will obey the following differential equations:
u˙
u
− buhφ−1g1−φe + ρ = 0 (2.14)
2.3 The Government
For simplicity, we assume that each time the government have balanced budget.
Namely, at each time t, the government collects tax capital (asset) income and spends
all on public education and on capital subsidy for active entrepreneurs. The budget
constraint of the government then states:∫∫
τa(a)raφ(a, z)dadz = ge +
∫∫ [
ληk(z)) · 1{z≥z}
]
raφ(a, z)dadz (2.15)
where φ(a, z) is the joint distribution of productivity and wealth.
3 The Aggregate Equilibrium Dynamics
An equilibrium in this economy is sequences of quantities and factor prices such that
(1) the representative worker and each entrepreneur maximize their expected sum of
discounted utilities subject to their corresponding budget constraint taking as given
equilibrium prices, (2) the government budget constraint (2.15) balances and (3) the
factor markets clear at each point in time as follows,∫∫
kdt (a, z)φ(a, z)dadz =
∫∫
aφ(a, z)dadz ≡ k(t) (3.16)∫∫
ndt (a, z)φ(a, z)dadz = uh (3.17)
Substituting capital demand from (2.6) into (3.16) and recall that z is i.i.d we
obtain the following capital market equilibrium equation
1 = λ (1−G(z)) (3.18)
which in turn determines the productivity cut-off z = λ
1
ϕ .
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The aggregate output denoted by y is then obtained by summing the amounts
of homogenous final goods produced by all active entrepreneurs, i.e., entrepreneurs
with idiosyncratic productivity higher than the cut-off z as:
y =
∫∫
f(z, k, l)φ(a, z)dadz =
∫∫ (
1− α
w
) 1−α
α
zλag(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
pi
α
λ
∫
aψ(a)da
∫
zg(z)dz =
pi
α
λk
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz
=
pi
α
λXk, where X ≡
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz
(3.19)
where g(z), ψ(a) denote the marginal distribution of idiosyncratic productivity and
wealth, respectively.
Substituting the optimal labor demand (2.7) into the labor market clearing con-
dition (3.17), we obtain uh =
∫∫
ndt (a, z)φ(a, z)dadz =
(
pi
α
) 1
1−α λXk, which then
implies that:
pi = α (λX)α−1 kα−1(uh)1−α (3.20)
Plugging this equation back to (3.19) we obtain the aggregate output as follows:
y = (λX)α u1−αk[1+α−1](h)1−α = Akα(uh)1−α (3.21)
where A is the endogenous measured TFP
A(t) ≡ (λX)α = E [z|z ≥ z]α
The wage rate, w, can be obtained by substituting (3.20) into the definition of pi
(2.9) and is,
w = (1− α)Akα(uh)−α (3.22)
The wage rate in (3.22) is equal to the aggregated marginal product of labor
implied from the aggregated production (3.21). This is because labor is competitively
provided by homogeneous skilled workers. However, in the capital input market,
there are distortions because of financial imperfections. In particular, substituting
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(3.20) into (2.8) to obtain the capital rental return rate after subsidy, r, as:
r =
1
1− ηk(z = z)
z
E [z|z ≥ z]αAk
α−1(uh)1−α
=
1
1− ηk(z = z)
z
E [z|z ≥ z] r¯ =
1
1− ηk(z = z)
ϕ− 1
ϕ
r¯
(3.23)
where r¯ is the aggregated marginal product of capital implied from implied from the
aggregated production (3.21) as,
r¯ = αAkα−1(uh)1−α (3.24)
For the exposition purpose, first consider the case when the government does not
intervene into the capital input market, i.e., ηk(z) = 0, then the capital rental rate
is equal to,
r0 =
z
E [z|z ≥ z] r¯ =
ϕ− 1
ϕ
r¯ < r¯ (3.25)
This is a consequence of financial imperfections. Intuitively, because all en-
trepreneurs including those with high productivity face borrowing constraints, the
equilibrium capital rental rate is equal to the marginal product of marginal en-
trepreneurs (those with productivity cut-off z). Because in most cases the average
productivity of actively producing entrepreneurs, i.e., E [z|z ≥ z], is higher than the
productivity cut-off, r0 < r¯ in general.
When we assume that idiosyncratic productivity z follows the Pareto distribution
as in (2.3) the rental rate depends on ϕ−1
ϕ
, where ϕ > 1 is the shape parameter
and smaller ϕ corresponds to a heavier tail of the productivity distribution or a
higher fraction of very productive entrepreneurs, hence, implying a higher degree
of productivity heterogeneity among entrepreneurs. Then it is intuitive that when
entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in productivity, i.e. low ϕ, rental rate is low, which
implies that capital is not efficiently used by marginal entrepreneurs.
The equation (3.23) implies that by intervening into the capital input market
with non-zero capital subsidy rate ηk(z) the government can influence the rental
rate, therefore affecting the accumulation of wealth and physical capital. In partic-
ular, when the subsidy rate for marginal active entrepreneurs is set to 1
ϕ
then the
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equilibrium rental rate in the presence of financial imperfections is equal to the the
aggregated marginal product of capital implied from implied from the aggregated
production r¯.
The dynamic equation of the aggregate capital stock is then derived by first
aggregating wealth of all entrepreneurs
k˙
k
=
1
k
∫∫
a˙g(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
1
k
∫∫
(λmax {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r, 0}+ (1− τa(a))r − ρ) ag(z)ψ(a)dadz
=
∫ ∞
0
(λmax {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r, 0}+ (1− τa(a))r − ρ) g(z)dz
and then dividing entrepreneurs into the inactive group (z < z) and the active group
(z ≥ z), therefore
k˙
k
= r − r
∫
τa(a)ψ(a)da− ρ+
∫ ∞
z
λ {zpi − (1− ηk(z))r} g(z)dz
= r − r
∫
τa(a)ψ(a)da− ρ+ piλ
∫ ∞
z
zg(z)dz − r − rλ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)g(z)dz
= piλX − ρ− r
(∫
τa(a)ψ(a)da− λ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)g(z)dz
)
= α (λX)α−1 kα−1(uh)1−αλX − ρ− r
(∫
τa(a)ψ(a)da− λ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)g(z)dz
)
= αAkα−1(uh)1−α − ρ− r (τ − λη)
where the third and forth equal signs are implied by the definition of X in (3.21),
z in (2.8), and pi in (3.20) and the effective asset tax rate policy, τ , and effective
capital subsidy rate policy,η are defined as follows,
τ ≡
∫
τa(a)ψ(a)da (3.26)
η ≡
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)g(z)dz (3.27)
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The budget constraint of the government becomes
ge =
∫∫ [
τa(a)− ληk(z) · 1{z≥z}
]
raφ(a, z)dadz
= [(τ − λη)rk] = y
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]
The aggregate equilibrium dynamics of the model economy can be summarized
up in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The dynamics of the aggregates and the fraction of non-leisure time
assigned to goods production can be expressed as:
y = Akα(uh)1−α
k˙ = αAkα(uh)1−α − [ρ+ ((τ − λη))r] k (3.28)
h˙ = b(1− u)hφy1−φ
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
(3.29)
u˙
u
− buhφ−1y1−φ
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
+ ρ = 0 (3.30)
where the measured aggregate productivity level are determined by
A =
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1z
)α
=
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
λ
α
ϕ (3.31)
The Balanced-Growth Path Equilibrium
Define the physical human capital ratio/intensity κ = k
h
as the ratio of physical
capital stock (per worker) over the average level of human capital and a balanced-
growth path equilibrium of this economy is established when,
y˙
y
=
k˙
k
=
h˙
h
= γ, for all t
where γ denotes the balanced-growth rate.
Substituting κ and γ into (3.28), (3.29), (3.30) and note that under a balanced-
growth path equilibrium, u and κ stay constant over time, we obtain the following 3
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equations for 3 variables, κ, γ and u as,[
1− (τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
]
αA
(κ
u
)α−1
− ρ = γ
b(1− u)hφ−1y1−φ
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
= γ
− buhφ−1y1−φ
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
+ ρ = 0
Consequently, the balanced-growth equilibrium fraction of working hour, u and
physical-human capital ratio κ are given by:
u =
ρ
γ + ρ
(3.32)
κ =
ρ
γ + ρ
(
αA
γ + ρ
[1− θ]
) 1
1−α
(3.33)
where
θ ≡ τ − λη
1− ηk(z = z)
ϕ− 1
ϕ
(3.34)
and the balanced-growth rate γ are determined by the following equation,
1 = b
1
γ + ρ
(y
h
)1−φ
[αθ]1−φ
= b
1
γ + ρ
[
A
(κ
u
)α
u
]1−φ
[αθ]1−φ
= b
1
γ + ρ
[
A
(
αA
γ + ρ
[1− θ]
) α
1−α ρ
γ + ρ
]1−φ
[αθ]1−φ
= b
1
γ + ρ
[
ρα
α
1−αA
1
1−α
(
1
γ + ρ
) 1
1−α
]1−φ [
[1− θ] α1−α αθ
]1−φ
(3.35)
which is equivalent to the following equations,
[γ + ρ]
1
1−α+
1
1−φ = b
1
1−φ
[
ρα
1
1−αA
1
1−α [1− θ] α1−α θ
]
(3.36)
Proposition 1. When the tax and subsidy policies are such that the following con-
dition
[ρ]
1
1−α+
1
1−φ−1 ≤ b 11−φ
[
α
α
1−αA
1
1−α [1− θ] α1−α θ
]
(3.37)
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is satisfied then there exists a unique positive balanced-growth path rate equilibrium
for this economy.
Intuitively, this Proposition states that for a given tax and subsidy policies τa, ηk
when financial markets are sufficiently deep, high λ, so that the measured aggregate
productivity level A is high and/or the human capital accumulation is sufficiently
efficient, high b, so that the condition (3.37) is satisfied then there exists a balanced-
growth path rate equilibrium.
Proof. Denote the LHS of (3.36) as H(γ), then because 1
1−α +
1
1−φ ≥ 2
dH(γ)
dγ
> 0, H(γ) ≥ H(0) = [ρ] 11−α+ 11−φ , for all γ ≥ 0
Rewrite (3.37) as,
[ρ]
1
1−α+
1
1−φ ≤ b 11−φ
[
ρα
1
1−αA
1
1−α [1− θ] α1−α θ
]
(3.38)
which equivalently states that the horizontal line representing the RHS of (3.36)
interacts the vertical axis at a point above H(0). Consequently, there exists a unique
non-negative solution 0 ≤ γ for the equation (3.36).
Notice that a higher A leads to a higher RHS of (3.36), hence a higher value
for the solution γ of this equation. Consequently, this Proposition also implies that
an economy with a higher measured aggregate productivity level thanks to deeper
financial markets will have a higher balanced growth path rate and a lower fraction
of working hours.
4 Optimal Growth Policies
In the previous section, I assume that tax and subsidy policy rates τa(a), ηk(z) are
given and identify the condition in which there exists a unique balanced growth
path equilibrium. In this section, I discuss the optimal capital taxation policies that
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maximize the balanced growth path rate. 10 Intuitively, a higher capital subsidy
rate and/or a lower asset income tax rate will promote physical capital accumulation
but it will reduce government spending on education ge, hence discouraging human
capital acquisition and vice versa. For the exposition purpose, let us denote:
Θ(τa, ηk) ≡ [1− θ]
α
1−α θ
=
[
1− (τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
] α
1−α
[
(τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
] (4.39)
Because the RHS of (3.36) can be written as b
1
1−φ
[
ρα
1
1−αA
1
1−α
]
Θ(τa, ηk), a higher
value for Θ(τa, ηk) will lead to a higher balanced growth path rate. Moreover, the
partial derivative of Θ(τa, ηk) with respect to θ is given by,
∂
∂θ
Θ(τa, ηk) = [1− θ]
α
1−α−1
[ −α
1− αθ + 1− θ
]
= [1− θ] α1−α−1
[
1− 1
1− αθ
]
= [1− θ] α1−α−1
[
1− τ − λη
1− ηk(z = z)
ϕ− 1
ϕ(1− α)
] (4.40)
Consequently, we obtain the following Proposition dictating the optimal policy
rule for pro-growth policies in this economy.
Proposition 2. The optimal policy τa(a) and ηk(z) obey the following rule:
τ − λη
1− ηk(z = z) =
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ− 1 (4.41)
where τ ≡ ∫ τa(a)ψ(a)da and η ≡ ∫∞z ηk(z)g(z)dz.
Proof. The proof is straightforward from (4.40).
Corollary 1. When ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 ≤ 1, the optimal pro-growth policy can be implemented
just by utilizing the asset income tax instrument τa(a).
10Because of balanced government budget, the determination of ηk implicitly determines govern-
ment spending on eduction ge.
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Proof. When ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 ≤ 1, by setting ηk(z) = 0, ∀z then (4.41) implies: τ = ϕ(1−α)ϕ−1 ≤
1. It is then straightforward that there always exists an optimal asset income tax
rate, e.g., a flat rate τ¯a that satisfies this condition.
Intuitively, this Corollary states that when the productivity of entrepreneurs is
not so heterogeneous, specifically, ϕ ≥ 1
α
, or ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 ≤ 1 then the optimal pro-
growth policy can be implemented by appropriately taxing on asset income and then
spending on public education.
Next, we will discuss the case when it is infeasible to implement the optimal pro-
growth policy without utilizing the capital subsidy instrument ηk(z). The reason
is straightforward. Because τ ≤ 1 so when ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 > 1 or ϕ <
1
α
, namely the
productivity of entrepreneurs is relatively heterogeneous the condition (4.41) can
not be satisfied with only one asset income tax instrument τa(a). To focus on how
and when the capital subsidy policy should be implemented we assume from here
that the effective asset income rate τ is given and is less than one. Rewriting the
equation (4.41) as,[
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ− 1 ηk(z = z)− λ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)g(z)dz
]
=
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ− 1 − τ (4.42)
which then implies the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. When ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 > 1, for a given tax policy τ , the optimal pro-growth
subsidy policy ηk(z) is set such that:
λ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)
ηk(z = z)
g(z)dz < τ (4.43)[
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ− 1 − λ
∫ ∞
z
ηk(z)
ηk(z = z)
g(z)dz
]
ηk(z = z) =
ϕ(1− α)
ϕ− 1 − τ (4.44)
Proof. First, under the condition (4.43) there exists a solution 0 < ηk(z = z) < 1
that satisfies the optimal rule (4.44). Second, for given τ, λ and the productivity
distributionG(z), we need to show that there exists an optimal subsidy policy ηk(z) <
1 for all z ≥ z.
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For instance, consider the following subsidy policy:
ηk(z) = ηk(z = z)
(z
z
)µ
, µ > 0 (4.45)
then we have λ
∫∞
z
ηk(z)
ηk(z=z)
g(z)dz = ϕ
ϕ+µ
. Consequently, (4.43) is satisfied if we set
µ > ϕ
(
1
τ
− 1
)
(4.46)
And, the capital subsidy rate for the marginal entrepreneurs at the productivity
cut-off is,
ηk(z = z) =
ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 − τ
ϕ(1−α)
ϕ−1 − ϕϕ+µ
(4.47)
Intuitively, this Proposition states that when the distribution of the idiosyncratic
productivity is heavy-tailed (low ϕ) and capital is relatively less efficiently utilized by
marginal producers as compared to the average/mean of all active producers so that
the capital rental rate is relatively low then the government should subsidize active
entrepreneurs. Alternatively, when the share of wealth held by active entrepreneurs
is relatively high then the pro-growth policy is to subsidize these entrepreneurs for
more efficient physical capital accumulation. 11
However, the condition (4.43) also states that it is infeasible to set the same flat
subsidy rate η¯k for all active entrepreneurs because in this case, (4.43) implies that
1 < τ , which is a contradiction. For policy feasibility, the government need either to
discriminate them according to their idiosyncratic productivity as in (4.45) or limit
the range of active entrepreneurs who can receive capital subsidy as follows:
ηk(z) = η¯k, for z ≤ z ≤ z˜ (4.48)
where η¯k and z˜ are to be determined.
Then we have λ
∫∞
z
ηk(z)
ηk(z=z)
g(z)dz = 1 − λ
z˜ϕ
. Hence, (4.43) implies that z˜ must
satisfy
z˜ <
(
λ
1− τ
) 1
ϕ
(4.49)
11Under the i.i.d assumption for productivity z, the distribution of the share of wealth held by
productivity type z is the same with the distribution of productivity z.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the optimal growth policies in an environment where heteroge-
neous entrepreneurs face borrowing collateral constraints, skilled workers accumulate
human capital, and the government provides public education to facilitate human
capital formation and intervenes in the capital market to promote economic growth.
The theoretical analysis shows that public policy can influence the balanced-growth
path equilibrium and the optimal growth policies depend on the degree of produc-
tivity heterogeneity. There are several possible extensions from this paper. One
is to have more tax instruments and to allow dynamic inter-temporal government
budget constraints so that the government can participate directly into the capital
market and conduct optimal policies with more freedom. Another is to add more
objectives to the optimal policies such as reducing distortions in the capital markets
and optimizing entrepreneurs and/or workers’ welfare in richer settings.
A Appendix: Adding Labor Income Tax
In this Appendix, I add the labor income tax instrument into the model in the main
text and demonstrate that all analytical results are similar. In particular, when the
government impose income tax rate, τn, the budget constraint of the representative
skilled worker becomes,
cw(t) = (1− τn)u(t)h(t)w(t) (A.50)
and the budget constraint of the government then states:
τnuhw +
∫∫
τaraφ(a, z)dadz = ge +
∫∫ [
ληk · 1{z≥z}
]
raφ(a, z)dadz (A.51)
Therefore, the Lemma 1 in the main text is replaced by
Lemma 2. The dynamics of the aggregates and the fraction of non-leisure time
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assigned to goods production can be expressed as:
y = Akα(uh)1−α
k˙ = αAkα(uh)1−α − [ρ+ ((τ − λη))r] k (A.52)
h˙ = b(1− u)hφy1−φ
[
τn(1− α) + (τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
(A.53)
u˙
u
− buhφ−1y1−φ
[
τn(1− α) + (τ − λη)
(1− ηk(z = z))
ϕ− 1
ϕ
α
]1−φ
+ ρ = 0 (A.54)
where the measured aggregate productivity level are determined by
A =
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1z
)α
=
(
ϕ
ϕ− 1
)α
λ
α
ϕ (A.55)
Therefore, the equation that determines the balanced-growth path rate, γ, be-
comes,
[γ + ρ]
1
1−α+
1
1−φ = b
1
1−φ
[
ρα
1
1−αA
1
1−α [1− θ] α1−α
(
τn(1− α)
α
+ θ
)]
(A.56)
where
θ ≡ τ − λη
1− ηk(z = z)
ϕ− 1
ϕ
which then implies that the equilibrium balanced growth path rate depends positively
on the following value that is the function of τn, τa, ηk:
Θ1(τn, τa, ηk) ≡ [1− θ]
α
1−α
[
τn(1− α)
α
+ θ
]
(A.57)
It is straightforward to obtain similar analytical results with the main text from
the above equations.
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